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The ex ante real rate of interest is one of the most important concepts in economics and finance. 
Because the universally-used Fisher theory of interest requires positive ex ante real interest rates, 
empirical estimates of the ex ante real interest rate derived from the Fisher theory of interest 
should also be positive. Unfortunately, virtually all estimates of the ex ante real interest rate 
published in economic journals and textbooks or used in macroeconomic models and policy 
discussions for the past 35 years contain negative values for extended time periods and, thus, are 
theoretically flawed. Moreover, the procedures generally used to estimate ex ante real interest 
rates were shown to produce biased estimates of the ex ante real rate over 30 years ago. In this 
article, we document this puzzling chasm between the Fisherian theory that mandates positive ex 
ante real interest rates and the practice of macroeconomists who generate and use ex ante real 
interest rate estimates that violate this theory. We explore the reasons that this problem exists and 
assess some alternative approaches for estimating the ex ante real interest rate to determine 
whether they might resolve this problem.     
 
INTRODUCTION 
Macroeconomics and macroeconomists are under widespread attack both from outside and within the 
economics profession. In his recent Wall Street Journal article, Kaletsky (2010) charged that 
“The greatest embarrassment for academic economics in the 2007-2009 crisis … [is their] 
failure to provide any useful guidance for politicians and central bankers after the 
[financial] crisis struck. …What economics did claim to offer was a set of analytical tools 
to explain reality and suggest sensible responses to unexpected events. It was in this 
respect that contemporary economics revealed its inadequacy.”       
Similarly, Rachman (2010), writing in the Financial Times, stated that “… policies … constructed 
according to the ‘laws’ of economics have a nasty habit of collapsing.” Wray (2011, p. 2) suggests that 
“What passed for macroeconomics on the verge of the global financial collapse had nothing to do with 
reality. It is difficult to see that anything taught in the best-selling textbooks in 2007 will survive.”  
 
Kocherlakota (2010, p. 5), President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, provides an even 
stronger condemnation:   
“… during the last financial crisis, macroeconomists (and I include myself among them) 
failed the country, and indeed the world. … Macroeconomics should have been able to 
provide […a systematic plan of attack to deal with fast-evolving circumstances …]. It 
could not. Of course, from a longer view, macroeconomists let policymakers down much 
earlier, because they did not provide [them] with rules to avoid the circumstances that led 
to the global financial meltdown. … 
[The] overall debate inevitably leads the general public to wonder: What is the value and 
applicability of macroeconomics as currently practiced?”
2 
Perhaps the most extensive list of popular criticisms of macroeconomics appears in Sargent (2010, p. 28), 
along with his ad hominem attack on these critics, whom he labels as “foolish and intellectually lazy … [, 
guilty of] woeful ignorance or intentional disregard for what much of modern macroeconomics is about 
and what it has accomplished.” 
  
In this article, we suggest that one likely cause for the alleged failures of macroeconomic models and 
macroeconomists’ policy advice is that virtually all estimates of the ex ante real rate of interest, one of the 2 
 
most important variables used in macroeconomic and monetary models, are theoretically questionable and 
empirically flawed. It should not be surprising that faulty estimates of a key macroeconomic variable 
yield macroeconomic analyses and policy recommendations that fail to “explain reality and suggest 
sensible responses to unexpected events.”
 We begin our analysis by briefly explaining the crucial role of 
the ex ante real rate of interest in all economic decisions. Next, we review Fisher’s theory of interest rates 
that provides the theoretical foundation for the ex ante real interest rates used in virtually all 
macroeconomic models and research. We then show that Fisher’s theory requires positive ex ante real 
interest rates, while virtually all estimates of ex ante real interest rates used by macroeconomists in recent 
decades contain negative observations over extended time periods. Next, we document that negative ex 
ante real interest rate estimates were shown to be spurious over 30 years ago—but that these warnings 
have been persistently ignored by macroeconomists. We then examine one possible reason for the failure 
of macroeconomists to recognize this problem. Finally, we explain why this problem is likely to persist. 
 
THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF THE EX ANTE REAL INTEREST RATE 
The ex ante real interest rate [hereafter, for simplicity, called the real rate of interest] is widely recognized 
as one of the most important variables in economics and finance. Because it represents the expected 
tradeoff between present and future consumption of goods and services, it plays a prominent role in 
virtually every decision that people make.  Mishkin (1988; p. 1064), for example, summarizes its role as 
follows:   
“Real interest rates are among the most important economic variables and have been 
studied extensively. They figure prominently in discussions of the transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy and also play a prominent role in explanations of 
business cycles and particular business cycle episodes [our emphasis]. Real interest rates 
are a central element in savings-consumption decisions and in debates about how to 
encourage savings …. Real interest rates are also a critical explanatory variable for 
investment decisions since they represent the real cost of borrowing.”  
 
Taylor (2000; p. 91) stresses its great importance in macroeconomic modeling and policy as follows: “… 
[The] nearly universal model … used to explain fluctuations [of real GDP] around the growth trend … 
can be boiled down to three relationships and three variables …” These key macroeconomic variables are 
real GDP, inflation and the real interest rate.  
 
FISHER’S THEORY OF INTEREST: THE REASONS FOR POSITIVE REAL INTEREST 
RATES 
Over a century ago, Fisher (1896, 1906a, 1906b) began to develop his theory of the determinants of 
nominal interest rates, culminating in the publication of The Theory of Interest (1930). Fisher theorized 
that the nominal (or market) rate of interest (i) on a specified financial asset is determined by the real 
interest rate (r
e) and the expected inflation rate (Π
e). Equation (1) presents the well-known simplified 






e                 ( 1 )  
 
The expected inflation rate (Π
e) in Equation (1) represents the anticipated change in a broad price index 
that incorporates the prices of all assets (new and used), commodities and services.
4 It measures the 
change in the general purchasing power of money over some specified time period. Since this price index 
can move up, down or remain unchanged, the associated expected rate of inflation can be positive, 
negative or zero.  
 
The real rate of interest (r
e) in Equation (1) represents the expected relative price paid for earlier 
availability of goods and services in real terms—that is, in terms of the goods and services themselves. 
Stockman (1996, p. 705) notes: “Economists define the real interest rate as the relative price of a single 3 
 
good at two points in time.” Fisher (1930, pp. 61-2) stated that real interest rates, in the world we inhabit, 
must be positive for two reasons: time preference and investment opportunities. 
“… [The real] rate of interest expresses a price in the exchange between present and 
future goods.… [In] the theory of interest, the [real] rate of interest, or the premium on 
the exchange between present and future goods, is based, in part, on … the marginal 
preference for present over future goods …called time preference or human impatience. 
The other chief part is the objective element, investment opportunity.”  
 
The marginal preference for present over future goods is called positive time preference. If individuals 
prefer consuming goods and services sooner rather than later, they require and, therefore, expect a positive 
real return for foregoing current consumption of goods and services. Of course, positive time preference 
exists for reasons beyond simple “human impatience”. As Alchian and Allen (1972, p. 176) note, “Some 
other considerations imply a lower present value of deferred goods. The certainty of death—the certainty 
that we shall some day not be able to enjoy some postponed goods may make us unwilling to give up 1 
gallon of gasoline (or anything else) today for just 1 gallon in the future.” Thirty years ago, Olson and 
Bailey (1981, p. 24) concluded that “… the case for positive time preference is absolutely compelling.” 
Laury et al. (2011) and Perez-Arce (2011) provide the latest evidence for positive time preference.  
 
Fisher (1930, pp. 191-193) explained why the existence of investment opportunities also required positive 
real interest rates: 
“In the real world our options are such that if present income is sacrificed for the sake of 
future income, the amount of income secured is thereby greater than the present income 
sacrificed … Nature’s productivity has a strong tendency to keep up the rate of interest. 
Nature offers man many opportunities for future abundance at trifling present costs. So 
also, human technique and innovation tend to produce big returns over costs.”  
 
What would it actually take to observe negative (or zero) real interest rates? Fisher considers this question 
and, whimsically, imagines the economic conditions necessary for negative or zero real interest rates. In 
“The Imaginary ‘Hard-Tack’ Illustration”, he discusses the plight of sailors shipwrecked on a desert 
island with only a few pounds of hard-tack for sustenance and no way to increase their stores of food. He 
demonstrates (p. 186) that, “in such a community, the rate of interest in terms of hard-tack [which does 
not deteriorate over time] would necessarily be zero!” He then considers “The Imaginary ‘Figs’ Example” 
in which shipwrecked sailors were left with a stock of figs rather than hard-tack (p. 191). Because, figs 
deteriorate naturally over time, the rate of interest in terms of figs would necessarily be negative. He 
concludes his discussion of these imaginary worlds as follows (p. 191-2): “The fact that we seldom see an 
example of zero or negative interest rates is because … we happen to live in an environment so entirely 
different from that of the shipwrecked sailors.” 
 
Thus, according to Fisher’s theory of interest, positive time preference and productive investment 
opportunities mandate positive real interest rates in the real world. Unfortunately, recent discussions of 
the negative estimates of real interest rates have either misunderstood or ignored Fisher’s rationale for 
positive real interest rates. Hamilton (2010), for example, offers the following puzzling analysis that, at 
the same time, supports and denies Fisher’s contention that the real interest rate must be positive:  
“What does a negative real rate signify? If you consider a simple one-good economy in 
which the output is costlessly storable, a negative real rate could never happen—people 
would simply hoard the good rather than buy such miserable assets. You're better off 
storing a can of tuna for a year than messing with T-bills at the moment. But there's only 
so much tuna you can use, and many expenditures you might want to save for can't really 
be stored in your closet for the next year. It's perfectly plausible from the point of view of 
more realistic economic models that we could see negative real interest rates, at least for 
a while.”  4 
 
 
While it may be “plausible from the point of view of more realistic economic models”, it is exceedingly 
implausible—actually impossible—from the point of view of Fisher’s analysis of the real rate in the 
world as we know it. Hamilton’s tuna fish example, a modern equivalent, perhaps, to Fisher’s hard-tack, 
correctly shows why the real interest rate cannot be negative in the cheaply storable one-good case. 
However, in a world with assets galore that provide positive real returns and numerous goods, like tuna, 
that can also be cheaply stored, it is highly implausible that the real interest rate can be negative. 
Hamilton’s casual comment about the likelihood of negative real interest rates is simply wrong.
5        
 
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: ESTIMATING THE REAL RATE OF INTEREST  
As Equation (1) indicates, Fisher’s theory is designed to explain the level of observed nominal interest 
rates on selected credit instruments. In contrast, r
e and Π
e are theoretical concepts that are neither directly 
observable nor measurable. Thus, some procedure must be used to generate estimates of, or proxies for, 
them in order to test the validity of the theory. 
 
Equations (2) and (3) show how real interest rate estimates are typically produced. 
 
rt
e = it – Πt
e         ( 2 )  
 
rtˆ = it - ptˆ          ( 3 )  
 
In Equation (2), the Fisher interest rate equation [Equation (1)] is “shuffled” to demonstrate how analyses 
of the real interest rate typically begin. As Haug et al. (2011, p. 1) note: “Fisher’s model determines the 
real interest rate as the difference between the nominal interest rate and the expected inflation rate.”
6 
However, because Π
e is a theoretical concept, specific econometric techniques or survey procedures are 
used to produce estimates of the expected inflation rate, (pˆ), as measured by changes in some selected 
price index (e.g., the CPI, the Core CPI, the GDP Implicit Price Deflator, etc.). Abel and Bernanke (2005, 
pp. 53-4) provide a brief discussion of this process:   
“... [Because] economists generally don’t know exactly what the public’s expected rate of 
inflation is … [, they] use various means to measure expected inflation. One approach is 
to survey the public and simple ask what rate of inflation people expect. A second 
method is to assume that the public’s expectations of inflation are the same as publicly 
announced government or private forecasts. A third possibility is to assume that people’s 
inflation expectations are an extrapolation of recently observed rates of inflation.” 
Barro’s (2010, p. 199) list of alternative procedures is similar, but not identical, to Abel-Bernanke’s list:  
“1. Ask a sample of people about their expectations.  
  2. Use the hypothesis of rational expectations, which says the expectations correspond 
to optimal forecasts, given the available information. Then use statistical techniques to 
gauge these optimal forecasts. 
  3. Use market data [from indexed bonds] to infer expectations of inflation.”  
 
Regardless of the exact process used to derive estimates of the expected inflation rate, Equation (3) 
indicates that they are then subtracted from the nominal interest rate to obtain estimates of the real interest 
rate, rˆ. The plethora of alternative procedures used to generate expected inflation rates indicate that there 
is considerable disagreement among macroeconomists about the best way to generate these estimates and, 
hence, to calculate estimates of the real interest rate. Darin and Hetzel (1995, p. 17) note that “Despite 
[its] importance …, there is no generally available measure of the real interest rate … Economists who 
have studied the real interest rate have had to create their own series.” Moreover, as Abel and Bernanke 
(2005, p. 54) comment: “Unfortunately, none of these methods is perfect, so the measurement of the 
expected real interest rate always contains some error.” Consequently, the real interest rate estimates 
widely used in macroeconomic models and policy discussions are obviously idiosyncratic and subject to 5 
 
errors of various kinds. In the following sections, we emphasize one crucial error associated with these 
estimates of the real interest rate.   
 
THEORY AND PRACTICE: REAL INTEREST RATE ESTIMATES PRIOR TO THE MID-1970s  
Macroeconomic research in the decades following publication of Fisher’s The Theory of Interest provided 
real interest rate estimates consistent with Fisher’s theoretical view that the real rate of interest is positive. 
For example, Figure 1 shows Yohe and Karnosky’s (1969, p. 34; their Chart VII) estimates of the long-
term real interest rate from 1961-9. Their alternative real interest rate estimates (which differ due to 
different estimation procedures) are all positive and range between 2 to 4 percent.  
 
The theoretical rationale and extant empirical evidence that real interest rates are positive was so well 
accepted that this conclusion appeared prominently in the leading principles of economics textbooks. For 
example, Alchian and Allen (1972, pp. 176-7) told their readers that: 
“The [real] rate of interest, then, reflects: (1) convenience of earlier availability, (2) 
preference for assured consumption over contingent consumption, and (3) ability to use 
income to increase total output. Any society—capitalist, communist, advanced, primitive, 
industrial, agrarian, democratic, totalitarian—in which these elements are present will 
have a positive rate of interest—that is, a rate greater than zero.”  
Similarly, Samuelson (1964, pp. 584-5) explained that: 
“ .. as long as any increase in time-consuming processes could be counted on to produce 
any extra product and dollars of revenue, the yield on capital could not be zero. Also, as 
long as any land or other asset exists with a sure perpetual net income—and as long as 
people were willing to give up only a finite amount of money today in exchange for an 
infinitely large amount of income spread over the whole future—then we can hardly 
conceive of the [real] rate of interest as falling to zero.” 
 
Thus, up to the mid-1970s, virtually all economists agreed with Fisher’s theoretical arguments, supported 
by empirical estimates, that, in the “real” world, the real rate of interest must be positive. Then, abruptly, 
this consensus changed. 
 
THEORY VS. PRACTICE: NEGATIVE REAL INTEREST RATE ESTIMATES SINCE THE 
MID-1970s  
Since the mid-1970s, virtually all macroeconomic studies have generated positive and negative real 
interest rate estimates, depending on the specified time period. Figure 2, which shows the nominal 3-
month Treasury bill interest rate and the actual rate of inflation (measured by the movement in the 
consumer price index for urban workers) from 1954, offers a potential reason for the change in the 
consensus that the real interest rate is always positive. In Figure 2, the nominal interest rate typically 
exceeded the actual inflation rate prior to 1973. Of course, the actual inflation rate should never be 
confused either with the expected inflation rate in Equations (1) and (2), or various estimates of the 
expected rate of inflation shown in Equation (3). Yet, the common movement in the interest rate and the 
inflation rate and the positive difference between them might be taken, somewhat loosely, as confirmation 
of the Fisher theory of interest and positive real interest rates.   
 
Then, unexpectedly, from 1973 to 1980 (see the shaded area in Figure 2), the interest rate-inflation rate 
relationship inverted: the actual inflation rate exceeded the interest rate. This same inversion has occurred 
during the current decade (see shaded areas). Thus, during much of the 1970s and the 2000s, the actual 
inflation rate exceeded the nominal interest rate, which made the ex post real interest rate negative. More 
importantly, macroeconomists’ estimates of the real interest rate were negative as well for these periods. 
 
We will not even attempt to list the hundreds (if not thousands) of articles, books and working papers that 
have produced and/or used negative estimates of the real rate of interest over the past 35 years. Instead, 6 
 
we will simply cite four examples to illustrate our general theme: negative estimates for the real interest 
rate now appear everywhere in the economic literature. 
  To “…construct and make available a number of alternative empirical measures of the real rate of 
interest”, Darin and Hetzel (1995, p. 17) compare inflation forecasts from four different sources 
and generate five alternative monthly estimates of the real rate of interest from November 1965 
through December 1994. All five of their series (pp. 37-45) contain negative real interest rate 
estimates for various months, especially during 1975 through 1977.     
  Gavin et al. (2005, p. 633) use “… four monetary general equilibrium models … [that] differ 
along two dimensions: the monetary authority’s policy rule and the nature of price adjustments.” 
They generate 12 alternative response patterns for their selected macroeconomic variables, 
including the real interest rate, r, when they solve their models for the impact of different 
“shocks”. Seven of their 12 alternative model solutions yield negative real interest rates. 
  Figure 3 [labeled, coincidentally, Figure 3 in their study] shows real interest rate estimates from 
1962-2008 in a recent study by Justiniano and Primiceri (2010, p. 20); their real interest rate 
estimates are negative during the 1970s and the current decade. 
  Figure 4 shows real interest rates estimates from 1831-2004 in a recent study by Weber (2010, p. 
8) in which he states that “… negative real interest rates are a key feature of American business 
cycle history. The real interest rate was negative in 35 years during the 174 years [shown].” 
 
NEGATIVE REAL INTEREST RATE ESTIMATES ARE FLAWED 
There are two reasons why negative real interest rate estimates are flawed. The first reason, as we have 
discussed extensively in previous sections, is that Fisher’s theory of interest requires positive real interest 
rates in the world as we know it. As Schwartz (1993, p. 11) notes “[I]n a market economy, the expected 
real rate [of interest] cannot be negative…” Similarly, Brown and Santoni (1981, p. 19) comment that 
“Casual observation suggests that the preconditions for a negative ex ante real interest rate do not now 
exist, nor did they exist in 1974 and 1975.” If we actually believe that the negative real interest rate 
estimates are accurate and useful empirical counterparts to the theoretical real interest rate in Fisher’s 
theory of interest, then economic conditions must also resemble those in Fisher’s Imaginary Fig World. 
Or, more generally, they must resemble conditions that Fisher (1930, p. 191-2) describes as follows: 
“ … [a negative real interest rate]  … would be true if there were a world in which the 
only provisioning of the future consisted of carrying over initial stocks of perishable 
food, clothing, and so forth and if every unit so carried over into the future were 
predestined to melt away …” 
Fisher (1930, p. 192) did not envision such economic conditions in the world as he know it.   
“One reason why we do not encounter such cases, with negative rates of return over 
costs, negative rates of interest and negative rates of time preference is that we have other 
income available from the future besides what can be carried over from current stocks. 
Future figs will come into being from fig trees and even existing stocks of figs and other 
perishables can be carried over for future use by canning, cold storage, preservation and 
similar processes.”  
If U.S. economic conditions in the mid-1970s and during this decade did not mimic Fisher’s “Imaginary 
Figs” world closely enough to make estimates of negative real interest rates plausible, then these 
estimates must be spurious. 
 
Several decades ago, two articles demonstrated that the use of inappropriate price indices to generate 
estimates of the expected inflation rate would produce spurious real interest rate estimates. First, Alchian 
and Klein (1973, pp. 481-2) showed that the price indices used to estimate expected inflation rates were 
theoretically flawed.  
“Two commonly cited … price indices [,] the … Consumer Price Index and the …GNP 
Deflator [,] … often … used … as measures of inflation and …targets and indicators of 7 
 
monetary and fiscal policy [,] … are theoretically inappropriate for the purpose to which 
they are generally put. …. The analysis in this paper bases a price index on the Fisherian 
tradition of a proper definition of intertemporal consumption and leads to the conclusion 
that a price index used to measure inflation must include asset prices.” 
 
Brown and Santoni (1981, p. 21) demonstrated the empirical relevance of Alchian-Klein’s theoretical 
discussion. In response to the initial cluster of published studies that generated negative estimates of the 
real interest rate in the late 1970s, they explained the reasons for the measurement problem inherent in 
these published estimates:  
“First …changes in … commonly used price indices produce biased estimates of actual 
changes in the general level of prices when the real interest rate is changing. Second, 
given that it is the expectations of market participants concerning the general level of 
prices that is relevant in Fisher’s theory of the nominal interest rate, estimates of the real 
interest rate that employ past changes in a commonly used price index as a proxy for 
expected inflation will be biased when the real rate is changing.”  
They showed the nature of the bias by comparing the prices of less durable (present) goods to those of 
more durable (capital) goods. They demonstrated that changes in these proxies for the real interest rate 
actually moved inversely to the published estimates of the real interest rate (pp. 23-26).  Thus, not only 
were the published estimates of the real interest rate biased, they were biased in the wrong direction.  
 
Later, Santoni and Moehring (1994) expanded the analysis of the measurement problem discussed in 
Brown and Santoni (1981) by examining the puzzling inverse relationship between estimated real returns 
on assets and estimates of the expected rate of inflation. They showed that this puzzling behavior was 
produced by the use of inappropriately narrow price indices to derive estimates of the Fisherian expected 
inflation rate. 
 
In the Appendix, we provide a simple example of the differences in the measured inflation rates and 
estimates of the real interest rate arising from changes in a narrow “cost of living” index vs. a broader 
“cost of life” index for alternative economic scenarios. We demonstrate that a change in the real interest 
rate produces biased estimates of both the inflation rate and the real interest rate for the narrowly-defined 
cost of living index, but not for the broadly-defined “cost of life index. In particular, we show that an 
increase in the real interest rate will produce both an increase in the narrow “cost of living” price index 
and a decrease in the estimated real interest rate. In fact, the estimated real interest rate is triply biased—
wrong magnitude, wrong direction of movement and wrong sign. 
 
GRADUATE ECONOMIC EDUCATION AND THE DUNNING-KRUGER EFFECT 
If the negative real interest rate estimates used by macroeconomists for decades are theoretically invalid 
and empirically spurious, how is it possible that macroeconomists have continued to use the Fisher 
interest rate theory and negative real interest rate estimates as if both are equally valid and equally useful 
for macroeconomic policy? One potential explanation that may provide some insight into this 
macroeconomic conundrum is known as the Dunning-Kruger Effect. As Dunning explains it (Morriss 
(2010a, p. 7)):       
“You could think of the Dunning-Kruger Effect as a psychological version of 
[anosognosia]. If you have, for lack of a better term, damage to your expertise or 
imperfection in your knowledge or skill, you are left literally not knowing that you have 
that damage.” 
Thus, the Dunning-Kruger Effect suggests that macroeconomists fail to recognize that their negative 
estimates of the real interest rate are spurious because they are ignorant of the Fisherian theory of interest 
itself. How could this have happened over the past several decades? 
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For one possible explanation of this phenomenon, we look back about 50 years ago, when Enthoven 
(1963, p. 422) described the requirements for success in economics as follows:    
“…the tools of analysis that we … use are the simplest, most fundamental concepts of 
economic theory, combined with the simplest quantitative methods. The requirements for 
success in this line of work are a thorough understanding of and, if you like, belief in the 
relevance of such concepts … combined with a good quantitative sense.  The economic 
theory we are using is the theory most of us learned as sophomores. The reason Ph.D.’s 
are required is that many economists do not believe what they have learned until they 
have gone through graduate school and acquired a vested interest in the analysis.” 
 
There has been increasing concern that graduate economic education has deemphasized the “fundamental 
concepts of economic theory” over the past decades and that Ph. D.’s no longer have “a vested interest” 
in, or, perhaps, much familiarity with, these concepts. For example, in their article subtitled “A Dismal 
Performance from the Dismal Science”, Ferraro and Taylor (2005, abstract) comment that  
“One expects people with graduate training in economics to have a deeper understanding 
of economic processes and reasoning than people without such training. However, as 
others have noted over the past 25 years, modern graduate education may emphasize 
mathematics and technique to the detriment of economic reasoning.” 
Similar criticisms of graduate economic programs have appeared in recent years. For example, Demsetz 
(2008, p. 4) remarked that 
“The work I choose to do is not heavily armored with math and econometrics. It is 
focused on the empirical and policy problems and on the logic of the theory that bears on 
these. Cold logic, imagination, and exposition by words, simple geometry, and basic 
statistics are the tools on which I have mainly relied throughout my career. ... Not many 
young economists adopt this working methodology today …. Economists in training 
seem to seek a body of data that is appropriate for the exploitation of technical tools 
rather than one which offers intrinsic economic interest.”  
Equally critical of graduate economic education, Allen (2010, p. 25) comments that  
“Economics departments continue to grind out numerous bright Young Scientists who are 
close substitutes for each other …. Few new grads seem to have a strong sense of, or feel 
for, or interest in the substance and use of traditional Economics at its best. Few see that 
… achievements of high sophistication are resultants of more than learned mechanics and 
convoluted techniques.”  
 
Of course, innovations in computer technology and econometric software over the past several 
decades have encouraged the rise of “bright Young Scientists” by making it relatively cheaper to 
specialize in what Allen might consider “learned mechanics and convoluted techniques.” 
However, these innovations alone should have enabled macroeconomists and others to further 
extend, develop and test the “fundamental concepts of economics.” As Sargent (2010, p. 28) 
noted in his response to criticisms of macroeconomics: 
“… it is true that modern macroeconomics uses mathematics and statistics to understand 
behavior in situations where there is uncertainty about how the future will unfold from 
the past. But a rule of thumb is that the more dynamic, uncertain and ambiguous is the 
economic environment that you seek to model, the more you are going to have to roll up 
your sleeves, and learn and use some math. That’s life.” 
 
Others, however, have suggested that the attention devoted to these techniques has displaced or 
crowded out the study of fundamental economic concepts in graduate schools. For example, 
Demsetz (2008, p. 4) comments that  
“Today, prospective employers seem to strongly emphasize demonstrable ability in 
econometrics and mathematics. I suspect that the large degree of specialization across 9 
 
fields of economics explains this, since it is now more difficult to have the knowledge of 
material in the many fields in which the renderer of judgment is not a specialist. 
Technical tooling offers a substitute, but heavy attention to these tools often hampers 
discovering the economist.” 
Similar comments have been made by Allen (2010, p. 233): “… the [Economics] professional arena now 
is largely one of gamesmanship in technique” and Krueger et al., (1991), who observed that economic 
graduate programs produced “… too many idiots  savants, skilled in technique but innocent of real 
economic issues.” Indeed, Allen (2010, p. 219) noted that he once asked Milton Friedman whether he 
should submit his manuscript on Irving Fisher to the Journal of Political Economy. Friedman responded 
that Allen’s “manuscript would not receive a fair assessment there because it was non-mathematical.” 
 Friedman suggested that he send it, instead, to the Journal of Law and Economics, which did publish it. 
 
It would require a detailed examination of changes in graduate economic program curriculums and 
dissertation topics over the past several decades to determine whether this specific “crowding out” 
assertion is valid. Unfortunately, we know of no such research to date. However, recent articles by Coelho 
and McClure (2005, 2008, and 2011) provide indirect evidence that supports this view. They examine the 
rise of “mathematical formalism” and the associated decline in empirical hypothesis tests in the economic 
articles published in recent decades. Figure 5 [Coelho and McClure (2011, p. 217; their Figure 1)] 
documents the dramatic rise in the number of articles that emphasize mathematical modeling (i.e., that 
contain one or more “lemmas”) in economic journals since 1954. Their research indicates that 
mathematical models have increasingly crowded out hypothesis tests in published economic articles. A 
similar criticism was made by a physicist, interested in using advanced computer power to map human 
economic behavior, who remarked [cited in (Hirsh (2010)] that “One of the dangerous cultural patterns 
that economics has fallen into is an excessive emphasis on theorem proof for its own sake rather than 
what gives you scientific results.” Coelho and McClure’s results are consistent with the Dunning-Kruger 
explanation applied to the puzzling behavior of macroeconomists who continue to use both Fisher’s 
theory of interest and real interest rate estimates that are inconsistent with this theory. 
 
CAN THEORY AND MACROECONOMIC PRACTICE BE RECONCILED?   
Consider the problem challenging macroeconomists who use estimates of the real rate of interest as 
integral components of their models, analysis and policy recommendations. Fisher’s theory of interest 
suggests that, in the world we inhabit, the real interest rate and, by extension, estimates of the real interest 
rate are always positive. In contrast, macroeconomists continue to generate and use empirical estimates of 
the real interest rate that are negative over extended time periods. The only way to reconcile theory with 
macroeconomic practice would be to derive estimates of the real rate that are consistent with Fisher’s 
theory. Unfortunately, although four alternative approaches have been suggested, none of them are likely 
to actually resolve this problem and reconcile theory with macroeconomic practice. 
  
1.  Find a Better Measure of Inflation: “Cost of Living” vs. “Cost of Life”.  
Alchian and Klein (1973) argue that the price indices commonly used to calculate inflation rates used as 
targets or indicators of macroeconomic policy, or employed in macroeconomic models, or used to derive 
estimates of the real rate, are theoretically inappropriate. Their analysis (pp. 173-4) shows that  
“A correct measure of the changes in the nominal money cost of a given level of utility 
level is a price index for wealth. If monetary impulses are transmitted to the real sector of 
the economy by producing transient changes in the relative prices of service flows and 
asses (i.e., by producing short-run changes in ‘the’ real rate of interest), then the 
commonly used, incomplete, current flow price indices provide biased short-run 
measures of changes in ‘the purchasing power of money.’ The inappropriate indices that 
dominate popular and professional literature and analyses are thereby shown to result in 
significant errors in monetary research, theory and policy.”    
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After deriving a theoretically correct price index that emphasizes intertemporal consumption 
optimization, they suggest that it could be called the current “cost of life” index to distinguish it from the 
“cost of living” labels generally associated with the CPI or PCE indices. Shibuya (1992) derived a similar 
intertemporal price index, which he called a “dynamic equilibrium price index” or DEPI. More recently, 
Filardo (2000) derived and used an ad hoc Alchian-Klein-type price index for monetary policy purposes.  
 
Although the “cost of life” price index avoids the biases in inflation and real interest rates estimates 
associated with the use of the usual “cost of living” price indices, it is extremely unlikely that an Alchian-
Klein “cost of life” price index will be developed and widely used for two related reasons. First, acquiring 
the additional information required to compile this index is extremely expensive. In a review of the 
Alchian-Klein approach, Goodhart (2001, p. F335) states that  
“The argument that an analytically correct measure of inflation should take account of 
asset price changes was made most forcefully by Alchian and Klein in 1973, and has 
never, in my view, been successfully refuted on a theoretical plane, though … their 
particular proposals have severe, perhaps incapacitating, practical deficiencies.”  
Similarly, Shibuya (1992, p. 105) notes the practical and theoretical problems associated with calculating 
and using his DEPI measure of the “cost of life” price index include “reliable and promptly available data 
on a comprehensive range of asset prices … [and adjustments] in the effects of long-term productivity 
changes…” As Alchian and Klein (p. 187-9) acknowledged, after describing the information necessary to 
compile a “cost of life” index, “The empirical problems are enormous.”  
 
Recently, however, Nakamura (2011, abstract) has argued that  
“ … a potentially large macro-micro database for the U.S. based on an extended version 
of the Flow of Funds … would have been of material value to U.S. regulators in 
ameliorating the recent financial crisis and could be of aid in understanding the potential 
vulnerabilities of an innovative financial system in the future. I also suggest that making 
the data available to the academic research community … would enhance the detection 
and measurement of systemic risk.”       
So, perhaps some of the additional data necessary to compile a “cost of life” index may be available in the 
future should financial market regulators decide that it would provide better financial market regulation 
and incur the costs of acquiring this data. 
 
The second reason why an Alchian-Klein-type price index is unlikely to be compiled and used is the 
apparent lack of demand for it by macroeconomists specifically or by the public in general. As Alchian 
and Klein note (p. 186)  
“… an individual … attempting to determine how much money wealth he now needs for 
a particular level of present and future consumption [should] use our index. But why, 
then, isn’t there a demand for a price index that includes asset prices and why do 
movements in the CPI appear to be politically important?”  
Carlson (1989, p. 14) suggests that the lack of interest in the Alchian-Klein price index may also reflect 
the preferences of monetary policymakers who want “measures of price movements [that make] the 
inflationary effects of their actions … readily identifiable. This means that the price measure most 
relevant to them differs from that most relevant to individuals.” 
                 
2.  Estimate the Real Rate of Interest From the Real Rate of Return on Capital   
Hosek and Zahn (1985) derived estimates of the real interest rate without using estimates of the expected 
inflation rate and the Equation (3) approach. Instead, they generated them from their estimates of the real 
rate of return on capital. They described their approach (p. 212) as follows: 
“Quarterly data for the U.S. are used … to estimate the real rate [of interest] implied in 
the neoclassical theory of capital formation where the value of the marginal product of 
capital equals its service price. Since the real rate [of interest] is an argument in the 11 
 
service price of capital, we can derive an expression for it in terms of factors shaping 
equilibrium in the aggregate capital market.”   
Their estimated real interest rates were positive throughout their 1954-81 sample period. 
 
For comparison, they generated two alternative (adaptive vs. rational expectations) estimates of the real 
interest rate using the usual Equation (3) approach described above. They note the key difference between 
their approach and the widely-used approach for estimating the real interest rate: “… unlike our estimate, 
both the adaptive and rational estimates [of the real interest rate] show negative values during the sample 
period, a factor which is difficult to reconcile with economic theory.” (p. 219). They conclude that 
  “A comparison of the statistical properties of our estimate with both adaptive and 
rational estimates of the real rate based on the Fisher Equation indicates substantial 
differences between our estimate and the others …The dissimilarities in the statistical 
properties of the estimates raise serious questions about the appropriate measure of the 
real rate used to evaluate the impact of economic policy on … aggregate demand. 
Although the accuracy of our [real interest rate] estimate relative to the other estimates 
can not be determined, its reliability as an explanatory variable in the appropriate 
structural equations of a model, which explains the interactions between the real and 
monetary sectors, is the subject of our continuing research.” (pp. 220-1).  
The Hosek-Zahn approach seemingly offers estimates of real interest rates that are consistent with 
economic theory, free from the measurement problems discussed by Alchian-Klein and Brown-Santoni, 
and avoid the possibly large data costs associated with calculating the “cost of life” index.  
 
However, there are three problems with their approach that argue against its widespread adoption by 
macroeconomists. First, Hosek-Zahn’s approach does generate negative estimates of the real interest rate, 
as they show in their Table 3 (p. 217-8).  
“Noting the high elasticity of the real rate with respect to the value of the marginal 
product of capital and given that our estimate of the output elasticity with respect to 
capital β plays an important role in that regard, we estimated the real rate with β varying 
between plus and minus one standard error. … Clearly the estimates of the real rate are 
sensitive to the value of β.”       
Their “sensitivity” analysis produces negative estimates of the real interest rate for 1970s for a β value 
that is one standard deviation below the estimate they use for their analysis. Thus, their approach does not 
avoid real interest rate estimates that are, as they described it, “difficult to reconcile with economic 
theory.” 
  
Second, their approach suffers from data problems similar to those faced by Alchian-Klein. In an article 
emphasizing the importance of accounting for maintenance and repair to properly measure a nation’s 
capital stock, McGrattan and Schmitz, Jr. (1999, p. 3) note that “For many countries, like the United 
States, it is not possible to determine the size of the maintenance and repair in the aggregate given current 
data collection procedures.” Therefore, the capital stock estimates necessary for Hosek-Zahn’s approach 
are erroneous and the real interest rate estimates derived from their approach are misspecified.     
 
Third, Hosek and Zahn’s article has failed the academic “market test”—it has essentially been ignored by 
the profession for a quarter of a century. A Scholar-Google literature search for the number of studies that 
have cited it since its publication in 1985 yields a count of exactly one citation—an unpublished working 
paper. Apparently, macroeconomists remain unconvinced of the usefulness of this approach for 
estimating the real interest rate—perhaps because it is considerably more difficult to use than the widely-
used, albeit error-prone, estimated inflation-Fisher Equation approach that uses inexpensive, publicly-
available price indices. 
 
3.  Estimate the Real Rate of Interest Using Commodity Futures Market Data   12 
 
Mishkin (1987, 1988) considers yet another potential alternative method to estimate the real interest rate. 
He uses spot and futures market prices for selected commodities to provide estimates of expected 
inflation rates for specific commodities. These expected inflation rate estimates are then subtracted from 
nominal interest rates to obtain estimates of the real rate of interest for these specific commodities. Then, 
an estimate of the general real interest rate is obtained from a weighted average of these commodity-
specific real interest rate estimates. 
 
Unfortunately, there are several problems with this approach. First, as Mishkin (1988, pp. 1064-5) points 
out, it is difficult to filter the data econometrically to derive estimates of the real rate of interest.  
“… own-commodity real rates constructed using futures market data contain information 
not only about the real interest rate for the aggregate economy or for a particular sector 
but also about ex ante relative price movements for the particular commodity. Since, as 
demonstrated in Mishkin (1987), these ex ante relative price movements (which can be 
thought of as noise) are far greater in magnitude than movements in the aggregate real 
interest rate (the signal), then the noise-to-signal ratio in own-commodity real rates will 
be very high. Own-commodity real rates constructed using futures market data will thus 
contain little information about the aggregate real interest rate of primary concern to 
economists.” 
In part, this problem may be the result of increased volatility of the underlying commodity prices in recent 
decades. Although Calvo-Gonzonez et al.’s (2010, abstract) recent study finds that “… there is no upward 
or downward trend in volatility [in commodity prices] over time”, they note that “… the timing and 
number of breaks in volatility [of commodity prices] vary considerably across individual commodities, 
cautioning against generalization based on the use of commodity price indices…”  
 
Moreover, because this approach incorporates only selected commodity prices, it involves an even 
narrower set of goods than the “usual suspects” used to generate expected inflation estimates. Thus, it 
would still produce biased and theoretically unacceptable estimates of the real interest rate for reasons 
discussed in Alchian and Klein (1973), Brown and Santoni (1981), and the Appendix to this paper. 
 
4.  Estimate the Real Rate of Interest Using Inflation-Indexed Securities  
Inflation-indexed securities are financial instruments whose principal and interest payments are tied to 
movements in some designated price index. A number of countries have issued inflation-indexed 
government bonds over the past 65 years—e.g., Finland introduced them in 1945, the U.K. in 1981 and 
Canada in 1991. The U.S. began issuing TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities) in 1997. The 
yields on TIPS have been used in macroeconomic studies in two ways. First, it has been argued that the 
yield spread between the interest rates on nominal and inflation-indexed securities provide estimates of 
expected inflation. For example, Craig (2003, p. 1) notes that  
“Treasury inflation-indexed securities are just like nominal Treasury securities, except 
that their coupon and principal payments are indexed to inflation. The yield spread 
between the two types of securities should serve as a daily measurement of the market’s 
perception of expected inflation, modified to reflect of the cost of inflationary risk.” 
Similarly, Campbell and Shiller (1996, p. 160) comment that inflation-indexed bonds “… may have some 
informational value because they make it easier for the monetary authority and other observers to impute 
the inflation expectations of bond-market investors.”  
 
Second, interest rates on indexed securities could be interpreted directly as estimates of the real rate of 
interest. Craig (2003, p. 1) explains that: 
“Economic theory separates the yield of a nominal Treasury [bill or bond] at its market 
equilibrium into several components: a real return, the expected rate of inflation and an 
inflation-risk premium … A TIIS [another term for TIPS] holder does not have to worry 
about the inflation component but only about the real return. Thus, at first glance, the 13 
 
TIIS yield should equal the nominal Treasury rate minus the expected inflation rate and 
minus a risk-aversion premium.” 
 
In other words, the TIPS yield might be used to provide a direct estimate of the real rate of 
interest. This is precisely what some analysts did when the recent TIPS auction yielded negative 
interest rates. For example, D’Altorio (2010) commented that “Investments that promise [our 
italics] negative yields don’t sound very sexy. But scores of people “went negative” this week, 
snapping up $10 billion worth of [TIPS] … [with] an astonishing negative 0.55% yield.” So, 
contrary to economic theory, did this result actually represent a financial market-based negative 
estimate of the real interest rate? 
 
Unfortunately, there are several problems with interpreting and using the yields on inflation-
indexed securities as estimates of the real rate of interest. First, a number of articles have shown 
that the yields on these securities cannot be directly interpreted as estimates of the real interest 
rate, chiefly due to the peculiarities of the indexing scheme used. Arak and Kreicher (1985) 
explain this problem with respect to U.K indexed securities: 
“Yields on price-linked securities, which provide nominal returns in line with inflation, 
could, in principle, provide a measure of the real rate of interest directly. … Most 
indexing schemes, however, are imperfect. For example, a time delay between 
computation of interest and its payment—a common feature—makes the payment worth 
less and requires that the investor be compensated by a yield which is greater than the 
real rate of interest. The observed yield on indexed securities cannot, therefore, be 
assumed to be a good estimate of the real rate of interest.”     
Similarly, Barr and Campbell (1996, p. 3) point out that  
“This feature of index-linked bonds creates technical difficulties in extracting implied 
real interest rates from index-linked bond prices. Observed changes in the price of an 
index-linked bond may reflect changes in inflation expectations, albeit with a sensitivity 
well below that of a purely nominal bond …” 
They then go on (pp. 3-4) to explain that various attempts to address this problem are, themselves, subject 
to theoretical, technical and econometric problems that make the derived estimates of the expected 
inflation rates and real interest rates problematic. 
 
A second problem with the estimates of the real interest rates derived from yields on indexed securities, 
over and above the estimation problems cited above, is that these securities are indexed to narrow price 
indices (e.g., the CPI) rather than the Alchian-Klein-type price indices discussed earlier. Therefore, the 
real rate estimates derived from these indexed securities are subject to the same errors of bias and 
mismeasurement discussed earlier. Consequently, it is not surprising that negative estimates of the real 
interest rate arise periodically, even from TIPS yields. 
    
A third problem with using estimates of the real interest rate derived from the yields on U. S. TIPS is that 
they have existed only since 1997. The relatively brief time period since their introduction makes it 
difficult to use TIPS yields to provide estimates for expected inflation or real interest rates for 
macroeconomic research and analyses. Consequently, studies of inflation-indexed securities use either 
U.K. indexed securities [Barr and Campbell (1996); Evans (1998)] or econometric models designed to 
estimate the movement of stylized (hypothetical) inflation-indexed bond yields for longer time periods 
[Campbell and Shiller (1996)]. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
Keynes (1921, p. v) stated that “The theory of economics is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus 
of the mind, a technique of thinking, which helps its possessor to draw correct conclusions.” McGrattan 
(2010) corroborates Keynes’ assertion in her recent article on the use of different statistical 14 
 
representations to the same prototypical business cycle model. She asks the question: “How much can 
business cycle theorists learn from actual time series if they impose very little theory when applying their 
statistical methods?” Her answer was “very little.” (p. 12). Without relevant theories to guide their 
analyses, economists are extremely unlikely to arrive at correct conclusions about the economy. 
 
This same problem arises when economists misuse or, even worse, ignore the theories that, presumably, 
are guiding their analyses. Fisher’s theory of interest is a cornerstone of macroeconomic analysis, so 
universally accepted and extensively used in macroeconomics and finance that Bullard (2010, pp. 340-1) 
maintains that “Practically speaking, any macroeconomic model of monetary phenomena will have a 
Fisher relation as a part of the analysis…” Similarly, as Taylor (2001) noted, the ex ante real rate of 
interest, as defined in Fisher’s theory of interest, is widely recognized as being one of the most important 
variables in economics and is used in virtually all macroeconomic and monetary models. Yet, without 
relevant measures of key macroeconomic variables to guide their analyses, economists are extremely 
unlikely to arrive at correct conclusions about the economy.   
 
In this article, we first reviewed Fisher’s theory of interest rates and demonstrated that the ex ante real 
interest rate is positive in the world as we know it. We then pointed out that virtually all estimates of the 
ex ante real rate of interest used in macroeconomic analyses over the past 35 years are theoretically 
invalid and empirically flawed because they contain negative values for extended time periods.  We noted 
that this problem was recognized and discussed in several published articles over 30 years ago—and then 
subsequently ignored when estimates of real interest rates were derived. We attempted to explain how this 
wide divergence between economic theory and macroeconomic practice might have arisen by invoking 
the Dunning-Kruger Effect and citing research on economic publication rates that is consistent with this 
explanation.  Finally, we reviewed four alternative methods to the one most commonly used to derive 
estimates of the real interest rate. We pointed out that three of them—those that estimate the real rate of 
interest from the real return on capital, futures prices for selected commodities and yields on inflation-
indexed securities—are unlikely to provide real interest rate estimates consistent with Fisher’s theory of 
interest. On the other hand, although the use of an Alchian-Klein-type price index to derive the expected 
inflation rate is likely to produce theoretically-consistent estimates of the real interest rate, the cost of 
generating this price index appears to be prohibitive at present. 
 
Is there a solution to the real interest rate morass? Unfortunately, not at the present time. In our opinion, 
the best way to proceed would be, first, to recognize that the procedures used to generate the real rate 
estimates currently used in macroeconomic models and policy recommendations yield estimates that are 
theoretically invalid and empirically spurious for the reasons presented in this article. Consequently, 
macroeconomic predictions and policy recommendations should be treated with somewhat more caution.  
 
Second, increased data collection and research efforts to generate Alchian-Klein-type price indices should 
be considered. Nakamura’s (2011) discussion that financial market regulation would benefit from the 
availability of similar data provides an new justification for collecting the data necessary to construct the 
cost-of-life price index.     
 
Finally, increased attention to the “fundamental concepts of economic theory” might improve our ability 
to recognize problems and anomalies when they arise rather than later when they become more 
problematic. Thoreau once remarked that “Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find 
a trout in the milk.” Finding negative estimates of the real rate of interest should be considered just as 















































































1.  With apologies to Ferraro and Taylor (2005) for “borrowing” the subtitle to their paper. 
2.  Amusingly, after his eloquent “mea culpa” for the failures of macroeconomics and 
macroeconomists, he then reassures the public that, actually “… macroeconomics has made 
important advances in recent years… [that] –coupled with a rededicated effort following this 
recent economic episode—position macroeconomics to make useful contributions to 
policymaking in the future.” Who said that “irony is dead”?  
3.  Equation (1) ignores risk factors, taxes and the “cross product” term (if the yields are not 
continuously compounded) that, if included, would alter somewhat the right-hand side of the 
equation but have no effect on our discussion. 
4.  See Alchian and Klein (1973) for a detailed discussion of the major differences between the 
broad price index envisioned by Fisher and the narrower price indices typically used in 
macroeconomic analysis and models. 
5.  Another problem with his discussion is that he applies the term “real rate” to both the ex ante 
real rate of interest and the ex post real interest rate. 
6.  Of course, it is equally true that the expected inflation rate is equal to the nominal interest rate 
minus the real rate. However, Equation (2) is used because macroeconomists and 
econometricians believe that it is easier to estimate the expected inflation rate and, then, solve 
for the real interest rate than vice versa. However, for examples of the reverse of the usual 
procedure, see Barro (2010, p. 200-1) and Gavin (2010). 
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A NARROWLY-DEFINED PRICE INDEX VS. AN ALCHIAN-KLEIN-TYPE PRICE INDEX 
FOR ESTIMATING THE EX ANTE REAL INTEREST RATE 
 
Consider the following example of very simple economy that contains people who hold money and apples 
and who own apple trees. In this economy, each apple tree produces 100 apples per year and lasts forever. 
The apples must be consumed during the year because they cannot be stored or otherwise carried over to 
future periods (e.g., as applesauce or apple wine). Table A1 depicts the prices of two goods (apples and 
apple trees) and the cost of two specific bundles of these goods in Periods 0 and 1 for two alternative ex 
ante real interest rates and a general inflation rate of 5%. One bundle consists of 100 apples, which we 
interpret as representative of the usual bundle of current consumption goods that make up the CPI and 
other commonly used price indices. The other bundle consists of 100 apples and an apple tree, which we 
interpret as an extremely simplified version of the “cost of life” index, the broad-based price index 
including both current consumption and long-lived assets discussed by Alchian-Klein. We have arbitrarily 
assigned a value of $2100 to the “cost of life” bundle in Period 0. 
 
Table A1: Apples, Apple Trees and the “Cost of Life”  
Period 0  1 
Panel 1: Ex Ante Real Interest Rate = 5%; Expected Inflation Rate = 5% 
  Nominal Interest Rate = 10%  Nominal Interest Rate = 10% 
  Price  Cost of Bundle  Price  Cost of Bundle 
Apples $1  $100  $1.05  $105 
Apple Trees   $2000  -----  $2100  ----- 
“Cost of Life”    $2100    $2205 
 
Panel 2: Ex Ante Real Interest Rate = 8%; Expected Inflation Rate = 5% 
  Nominal Interest Rate = 13%  Nominal Interest Rate = 13% 
  Price  Cost of Bundle  Price  Cost of Bundle 
Apples   $1.56  $156  $1.64  $164 
Apple Trees   $1994  -----  $2041  ----- 
“Cost of Life”    $2100    $2205 
 
Panel 3: Ex Ante Real Interest Rate Unexpectedly Changes from 5% to 8% 
Expected Inflation Rate = 5% 
  Nominal Interest Rate = 10%  Nominal Interest Rate = 13% 
  Price  Cost of Bundle  Price  Cost of Bundle 
Apples   $1  $100  $1.64  $164 
Apple Trees   $2000  -----  $2041  ----- 
“Cost of Life”    $2100    $2205 
 
Panels 1 and 2 in Table A1 show the individual prices of apples, apple trees, the cost of a bundle of 100 
apples and the “cost of life” (100 apples and 1 apple tree) in Periods 0 and 1. The relative prices of an 
apple tree in terms of the cost of the bundle of 100 apples in both periods in Panels 1 and 2 reflect the 
relevant real interest rate, and the changes in the costs of the two bundles from Period 0 to Period 1 reflect 
the inflation rate of 5%.  
Panel 3 in Table A1 shows the individual prices of apples, apple trees, the cost of a bundle of 100 apples 
and the “cost of life” in Periods 0 and 1 when the real interest rate rises unexpectedly between Periods 0 
and 1, while the overall inflation rate remains at 5%. The increase in the real interest rate directly affects 
the nominal interest rate, the individual prices of apples and apple trees and, of course, the relative price 25 
 
of apples to apple trees. However, it does not affect the rise in the “cost of life” from Period 0 to Period 1, 
which increases solely due to the general inflation rate.  
 
Table A2 shows the observed (ex post) inflation rates for the cost of the two bundles depicted in Panels 1 
– 3 of Table A1. It also shows two estimates of the ex ante real interest rate (Estimates A and B in 
columns 5 and 6) when the observed inflation rates are subtracted from the nominal interest rates in 
Period 0 and Period 1.  
  
Table A2: Inflation Rates and Ex Ante Real Interest Rate Estimates   
Bundle  Cost of Bundle 
in Period 0 
Cost of Bundle 
in Period 1 
Inflation Rate 
from Period 0 
to Period 1 
Real Rate 
Estimate A: 
Interest Rate in  




Interest Rate in 
Period 1 Minus 
Inflation Rate 
Panel 1: Ex Ante Real Interest Rate = 5%; Expected Inflation Rate = 5%; Nominal Interest Rate = 10% 
100  Apples  $100 $105 5%  5%  5% 
“Cost of Life”  $2100  $2205  5%  5%  5% 
      
Panel 2: Ex Ante Real Interest Rate = 8%; Expected Inflation Rate = 5%; Nominal Interest Rate = 13% 
100  Apples  $156 $164 5%  8%  8% 
“Cost of Life”  $2100  $2205  5%  8%  8% 
      
Panel 3: Ex Ante Real Interest Rate Unexpectedly Increases from 5% to 8%; 
Expected Inflation Rate = 5%;Nominal Interest Rate Increases from 10% to 13% 
Panel 3       
100  Apples  $100 $164 64% -54% -51% 
“Cost of Life”  $2100  $2205  5%  5%  8% 
 
Note that the inflation rates in the cost of both bundles from Period 0 to Period 1 (column 4) in Panels 1 
and 2 equal 5% regardless of the level of the real interest rate. However, as Panel 3 indicates, the 
unexpected rise in the ex ante real interest rate produces a sharp increase in the inflation rate for the 
consumer goods bundle (100 apples) but leaves the inflation rate for the “cost of life” equal to 5%.  
 
The impact of an unexpected rise in the ex ante real interest rate on estimates of the ex ante real interest 
rate derived from changes in the costs of both bundles is clearly shown in the last two columns of Panel 3. 
The estimated ex ante real interest rate using the inflation rate for the bundle of 100 apples has declined to 
negative values. In sharp contrast, the ex ante real interest rate estimates using the inflation rate for the 
“cost of life” index correctly capture both the levels of the ex ante real interest rate in each period and the 
rise in the ex ante real interest rate from Period 0 to Period 1.       